

## Presentation in class

Presentation: 20 minutes (Notebook/Beamer + overhead available)

- Slides to be handed in
- Slides to be made available to colleagues

Date: Thursday, 9 July, 9am - (early afternoon)

Procedure: Please select 2-3 papers of the list below below (so that we can then allocate one paper to you) and send the titles to [uebelmesser@lmu.de](mailto:uebelmesser@lmu.de) by the end of May.

## References

### **Political Economy of Education / Social Security:**

1. Galasso, Vincenzo (2008): "Postponing retirement: the political effect of aging", *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 2157-2169.
2. Shelton, Cameron A. (2008): "The aging population and the size of the welfare state: Is there a puzzle?", *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 647-651. / Shelton, Cameron A. (2008): "Addendum: The aging population and the size of the welfare state: Is there a puzzle? [Journal of Public Economics 92 (2008) 625-671]", *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 2282-2283.
3. Bethencourt, Carlos, Vincenzo Galasso (2008): "Political complements in the welfare state: Health care and social security", *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 609-632.

### **Democracy:**

4. Acemoglu Daron and James A. Robinson (2000), "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115, 1167-1199.
5. Lizzeri, Alessandro and Persico Nicola (2004) "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with and Application to Britain's age Reform", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119, 707-765.

### **The Political Economy of Debt**

6. Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini (1990): “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt”, *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 57/3, 403-414.
7. Aghion, P. and P. Bolton, “Government Domestic Debt and the Risk of a Default: A Political-economy Model of a Strategic Role of Debt,” In R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi, eds., *Public Debt Management: Theory and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

### **Political Economy and Monetary Politics**

8. Riboni, A. and Ruge-Murcia F., “Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority”, forthcoming *Quarterly Journal of Economics*

### **Selection into Politics:**

9. Bo, Ernesto dal, Pedro dal Bo and Jason Snyder (2009): “Political Dynasties”, *Review of Economic Studies* 76, 115–142.
10. Besley, T. (2004): “Paying politicians: theory and evidence”, *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2, 193–215.
11. Caselli, F. and Morelli, M. (2004): “Bad politicians”, *Journal of Public Economics* 88, 759–782.
12. Messner, M. and Polborn, M. K. (2004): “Paying politicians”, *Journal of Public Economics* 88, 2423–2445.

### **Miscellaneous:**

13. Ferreira, F. and J. Gyourko (2009): “ Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pp. 399-422.
14. Profeta (2007): “Political Support and Tax Reforms with an Application to Italy”, *Public Choice* 131, 141-155.